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I.  Introduction 
Historically, rates of protection have varied substantially over time.  In the much-studied case 
of protection of industrial products in developed countries, this variability has been greatly 
diminished as a result of the progressive lowering of multilaterally agreed tariff bindings. 
Caves, Frankel and Jones (1993) estimate that U.S. tariffs averaged 40 percent in the 
nineteenth century, with this average varying between 20 percent and 60 percent.  In the first 
half of the twentieth century, U.S. tariffs followed a similar pattern, again ranging from a low 
of approximately 20 percent to a high of 60 percent.  Since the establishment of GATT in 
1947, average U.S. tariffs have fallen to less than 5 percent, while the variance of individual 
bound tariffs has been virtually eliminated.
1 However, the stochastic nature of protection has 
remained strongly evident across individual sectors and instruments free from, or lightly 
constrained by, multilateral trade rules. Thus, protection rates have varied substantially in 
areas such as agriculture (in both developed and developing countries) and in industrial 
products in developing countries.  When we look beyond bound tariffs on industrial goods, 
we find that a wide range of measures such as variable levies, import quotas, voluntary 
export restraints (VERs), import surcharges, and the various forms of contingent protection 
are widely used to generate time-varying rates of protection.
 2 
                                                   
1 Caves, Frankel, and Jones (1993, Chapter 14).  Changes in bound U.S. tariffs outside the scope of 
multilateral and bilateral liberalization exercises have become a relatively rare event. Tariffs in countries 
outside the GATT system, like U.S. duties on imports from non-members of the WTO, remain subject to 
movements induced by political winds. 
 
2 A major thrust of trade policy research in recent decades has been the development of political economy 
models to represent the process of trade policy formulation. These models specify national trade policy 
measures as being determined by a set of explanatory variables operating through a political process, which 






   
  During the Uruguay Round, the coverage of tariff bindings was greatly expanded, 
with the coverage of bindings on agricultural commodities increasing to almost 100 percent 
of relevant tariff lines.  There were also large increases in the coverage of bindings on 
industrial product imports into developing countries. Negotiations on China’s accession to 
the WTO have also involved the introduction of bindings on previously unbound import 
tariffs.  Bindings set in past negotiations serve as the starting point for any new negotiations 
on tariffs.  However, while the range of trade covered by bindings has expanded, many of the 
new tariff and other instrument bindings introduced by the Uruguay Round agreements 
represent relatively loose constraints on policy, being set at or above the currently applied 
rates of protection.  For this reason, in future negotiations we can expect that developing 
countries will again expect credit even while keeping industrial bindings above current 
applied rates.  We can also expect that both developed and developing countries will expect 
credit for reducing agricultural bindings that otherwise still remain well above applied rates.  
To analyze the effects of these measures requires techniques that have not been widely used 
by trade policy analysts. 
  Trade negotiators have long recognized the importance of tariff bindings in an 
otherwise uncertain world, and the introduction of constraints on countries’ trade policies is 
at the heart of the multilateral trading system.  The very structure of market access 
commitments under the GATT is centered on the concept of bindings.  In policy discussions 
of market access, special emphasis is often placed on the perceived benefits of reductions in 
the uncertainty confronting exporters regarding commercial policy.  This is manifested in 
trade negotiations, where negotiating credit is sometimes given even for tariff bindings at or 
above initial applied rates. Yet, economists have given relatively little attention to formal 
evaluation of the benefits of tariff bindings and other commitments in the context of time-
varying underlying protection processes.
3   
                                                                                                                                                   
been on explaining the level of protection at any time, it seems clear to us that the models used imply that 
unrestrained protection will typically be subject to uncertainty.  In our view, this body of literature provides a 
rather convincing rationale for treating the rate of protection as inherently uncertain, with uncertainty arising 
both from the stochastic nature of the explanatory variables in the policy formulation process, and from the 
stochastic nature of the policy process itself.  (See, for example, Magee, Brock and Young, 1989; Grossman 
and Helpman 1994; 1995.  A survey is provided by Francois and Martin (1998). 
 
3 The literature on trade under uncertainty emphasizes stochastic disturbances in preferences or technology.   






   
  Our objectives in this paper are twofold: to push our notion of protection and trade 
liberalization further away from one based primarily on fixed policy instruments, and closer 
to one that involves policy regimes subject to variability; and to offer a relatively simple 
analytical framework for examination of the implications of rules-based commitments for 
relative security of market access in this context.  We first examine the impact of policy rules 
on the expected cost of protection in own markets, and for the conditions of market access in 
export markets. A simple stylized examination of Uruguay Round bindings on wheat is then 
provided as an illustration. 
 
II.  The welfare implications of commercial policy variability  
We start with a simple general equilibrium representation of the welfare effects of 
protection that varies over time. Our emphasis in this section is on protection in import 
markets (i.e. own protection).  This will be extended to a more general representation of 
market access conditions (i.e. uncertainty about protection by trading partners as well) in 
the next section.   
  A convenient approach to evaluating the welfare impacts of protection in general 
equilibrium is the Balance of Trade function (Lloyd and Schweinberger 1988; Anderson 
and Neary 1992). Under this approach, a money measure of the change in welfare resulting 
from a tariff is obtained by evaluating the change in the balance of trade necessary to 
maintain constant utility (i.e. the net transfer needed to maintain welfare), given a change 
in policy.  A policy distortion that reduces domestic efficiency increases the costs of 
achieving a given level of utility, and requires a transfer from the rest of the world to 
maintain that utility level.  As will become evident, this approach, while fully general, can 
be used to illustrate general equilibrium welfare effects through familiar geometric tools 
normally associated with partial equilibrium models.  (See Martin 1997; Francois and Hall 
1997).   
                                                                                                                                                   
notable exceptions of Stockman and Harris (1986) and Barari and Lapan (1993), who examine asset markets 
under tariff uncertainty, and Stahl  and Turunen-Red (1995), who examine tariff games, the formal 
implications of stochastic tariff regimes remain relatively unexplored.  The formal literature on trade rules 
and institutions focuses instead on rules in the context of tariff games between governments.  (In this regard, 






   
  We start by defining general equilibrium for a small country in terms of dual 
expenditure and revenue functions.  The value of output is defined by the function g( p, v), 
and the expenditure function by e( p, u ): 
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In equations (1) and (2),  e(p,u) is the expenditure required to achieve the level of utility u at 
the vector of domestic, distorted prices p, and g(p,v) is the gdp function indicating the 
maximum production revenue which can be generated with resource endowments v at 
domestic prices p. The vector of domestic demands for output is given by the vector of 
first derivatives of  e(p,u) with respect to  p, e p ,  while the domestic output vector is 
represented by g p. The gap between the domestic and the world price, (p-p*), is the tariff 
on imports, so that tariff revenues are given by (ep - g p)(p - p
*).  The balance of trade 
function for an economy subject only to trade distortions is then defined as: 
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  It is convenient to rewrite (3) in terms of the net revenue function z(p,u,v)=e(p,u)-
g(p,v) and its derivatives. Thus: 
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  To consider the effect of discrete changes in protection on the balance of trade 
function, we use a second-order Taylor Series expansion. This yields the following 
expression for the welfare effects of any set of tariff changes :
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Note that the final term in (5) vanishes if the vector of excess demand curves, zp , is locally 
linear
5 or if the Taylor Series Expansion is about an undistorted equilibrium where (p-p*) 
is zero. To provide some intuition into equation (5), we evaluate the expected costs of a 
single tariff subject to uncertainty about a free trade equilibrium, and obtain:: 
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where the first and last terms on the right hand side of (5) disappear because we are 
considering the change in the tariff from zero; Dp can be replaced by t = (p - p
*) following 
the introduction of the tariff;  and where mt  and st
2 are the mean and variance of the tariff.  
Note that, in deriving equation (6), we have not made explicit assumptions about the type 
of distribution (e.g. normal or gamma) that best characterizes the distribution of protection. 
 Note also that equation (6) can be used for comparison of alternative regimes when both 
are away from free trade. The basic approach (see Francois and Hall) involves comparing 
the implications of each regime vis-à-vis a free trade benchmark.  This approach will be 
followed explicitly in the numeric example section. 
  From (6), we can see that our general equilibrium approximation of the cost of 
protection on imports, relative to a free trade benchmark where (p-p
*)=0, is determined by 
the second moment of the tariff about the origin, E(t)
2 , multiplied by 1/2 times the slope 
of the compensated import demand curve, zpp. Since the second moment about the origin is 
                                                   
4 The reader can, of course, make alternative assumptions about the local properties of the excess demand 
curve.  The present approach buys us a great deal of analytical clarity, without changing the qualitative 
message of this section. 






   
equal to the sum of the mean squared and the variance, the expected cost of protection is 
given by one half the (absolute) slope of the compensated excess demand curve times the 
sum of the mean tariff  and the variance of the tariff . This implies that in a stochastic 
world, absolute reductions in the variance of protection and in the mean-squared rate of 
protection have the same qualitative impact on the costs of protection.  
 
III.  Some geometric interpretations 
A.  The costs of a country’s own import protection 
We next turn to a geometric representation of the welfare implications of bindings on 
import protection. Although o ur underlying formulation is fully general equilibrium in 
nature, and completely general with respect to the number of tariff instruments, there are 
substantial expositional advantages that follow from focusing on the case where there is 
only a single distortion.  Equation (6) can be given a graphical interpretation using Figure 
1, which depicts the compensated import demand curve, zp.  If we first consider the case of 
a deterministic tariff of  (p-p
*), then our general equilibrium welfare measure is 
approximated by the Harberger triangle cab under the excess demand curve in Figure 1. 
This area is equal to -½z pp(p-p
*)
2.  To illustrate the nature of the higher costs associated 
with variable protection, consider symmetric variations around this tariff level, with a 
higher tariff yielding a higher domestic price of ph in one period, and a lower tariff yielding 
a lower domestic price, pl in another time period. In Figure 1, the higher tariff has a 
welfare cost represented by area cfg, while the cost of the lower tariff is represented by 
area cde. Clearly, the average cost associated with the varying protection is greater than 
area  cab associated with the same average rate of protection. This asymmetry is a 
manifestation of the convexity of equation (6) in the tariff rate.  
  Standard analysis of the welfare effects of a tariff is based on the assumption that a 
tariff remains fixed, such that the variance term is zero. Under this assumption, equation 
(6) collapses to: 
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Comparison of equations (6) and (7) makes it clear that the basic element missing under the 
assumption of a fixed rate of protection is the variance term, which maps directly into the 
welfare impact of protection. 
  Equation (6) provides a formal representation of the concept of market security so 
much emphasized in qualitative analysis of trade policy.  By combining the impacts of 
changes in bindings on both the mean and the variance of protection into a single measure of 
welfare change, it allows us to provide a quantitative estimate of the extent to which 
protection policy restrained by GATT-type disciplines is to be preferred over protection 
which is free to vary in an uncontrolled manner.  Early in the liberalization process, when 
tariff bindings may be high relative to the underlying mean of the distribution of protection, 
the gains from subjecting protection to multilateral disciplines may be due more to 
reductions in variability than to reductions in the mean level of protection. This implies that 
the near-universal omission  of the beneficial impacts of reductions in the variability of 
protection in studies of multilateral trade liberalization may have greatly understated the 
gains, particularly in the early stages of the process.  Of course, binding reductions in the 
extremes of the underlying distribution (like recent 500% or more bindings for some 
agricultural products) may have no discernable impact on the mean or variance of protection, 
being little different from infinite bindings. 
  The formula for the cost of variable protection given in equation (6) also provides us 
with a simple approach to estimating the relative reduction in the cost of protection 
associated with the introduction of a binding. This involves estimating the mean and the 
standard deviation of protection before and after the new binding. Squaring these and adding 
them yields the second moment of the rate of protection, t, about zero.  Note that zpp can be 
replaced by M0 e  where M0 is the free trade level of imports, e is the (constant) import 
demand elasticity, and free trade prices are normalized to 1.  Taking  -½z pp to be 
approximately constant, the proportional reduction in the second moment about zero will 
give the proportional reduction in the cost of protection. 
  If we index the base cost of protection at Io=100, then we can define a welfare-
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We will revisit the application of equations (6) and (8) in the computational section of the 
paper. 
 
B.  Benefits of improved market access 
While as trade economists we often emphasize import protection when subjecting trade 
policy to formal analysis, political emphasis during negotiations is actually placed on 
protection in export markets. Improved market access, which to exporters means more 
restrictive bindings on protection in export markets, is the price demanded by governments 
for own-liberalization.  This follows, in part, from the willingness of individual exporters to 
back initiatives that involve improved access to their export markets.
6  This is not the end of 
the story, however.  We should also expect reduced general levels of uncertainty about 
trading conditions in export markets to have welfare implications for the economy as a 
whole.  In this section, we offer a simple but formal representation of improved market 
access in the context of bindings. 
  There are similarities between the exercise undertaken here, and the literature on 
commodity price stabilization.  There are also important differences, and it is the differences 
that we emphasize.  One well-known result of the commodity price stabilization literature is 
that terms of trade volatility following from export price volatility (or identically in our 
framework volatility of foreign market access conditions) can be good compared to certainty 
with the same mean export price.  This is because positive price shocks for exports can yield 
benefits that outweigh the losses from negative shocks.  It is important to recall that, in the 
present context, bindings act asymmetrically on the volatility of market access.  They are 
designed to target the "bad episodes" only.  As such they limit the magnitude of negative 
market access shocks that can follow from policy volatility.  Hence they result in a situation 
where the bad variations are limited, and consequently the mean market access condition is 
                                                   
6  If one believes that own-liberalization is an important source of welfare gains, then the GATT/WTO can be 
viewed as a very successful trick.  By pressing for mutual liberalization in export markets, Member countries 
are actually, on net, acting as if they were jointly pursuing import liberalization (as one’s own imports are  






   
improved.  Because of this asymmetry, bindings on trading partners are good for an exporter 
as they skew volatility toward "good episodes" and lead to an improvement in the mean level 
of market access as a consequence. 
  At a general equilibrium level, terms-of-trade shocks following from changes in 
market access conditions imply a shift in the relative price of exports to imports.  In a 
standard two-good model, this means we can illustrate the welfare impact through either the 
export or import market.  For consistency with the previous section, we maintain our 
representation in terms of the import market.  Formally, we start by again assuming a small 
country.  Its terms of trade are taken as given, and its structure is again represented by 
equations (1)-(2).  While the country is small, its trading partners are not, and their import 
protection (collectively)  influences the price that the home country pays for its imports, in 
terms of  its exports.  Note that we are now working in broader terms than in the previous 
section.  It helps here to think in terms of a single import good and single export good (as in 
the Heckscher-Ohlin model, for example).  Our market in Figure 1 then represents t he 
market for the composite import good. When it clears, the export market also clears. Taking 
the export good as the numeraire,  p again represents the price of our import good (though 
this is now a single or composite import good), and the term  zp represents net import 
demand.  Since it is relative prices that matter, terms-of-trade shocks translate into changes in 
the ratio of import to export prices (where the export price is arbitrarily set at unity). 
Focusing now on foreign market access, and ignoring the second-best impacts of world price 
changes on the costs of the home country's own policy distortions (see Martin 1997 for a 
graphical interpretation), such that p=p* we take a second order Taylor Series expansion of 
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  Within this framework, how do we represent market access in export markets in a 
stochastic context?  We will assume that the absence of protection in export markets defines 






   
markets, which mean worse conditions of market access, are characterized by a probability 
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Where hx is the mean expected deterioration in the terms of trade resulting from partner 
protection, and sx2 is the associated variance term.  Note the strong similarities between the 
form of equation (6) and the second part of equation (10).  The only difference is sign, 
which follows from the fact that one focuses on import tariffs, and the other on import prices 
(following from protection in export markets).  Critically, equation (10) contains a terms-of-
trade effect that is absent in equation (6).  Basically, with increases in protection in export 
markets, our small exporter will register a deterioration in its expected terms of trade as 
reflected by a rise in its relative import prices p*.  This is a first-order effect, and so is likely 
to be larger than the second-order impacts identified in equation (10).  In addition, equation 
(10) contains one second-order term involving the mean-squared level of protection in 
export markets, and one involving variations in this access to partner markets.  This is the 
formalization of terms-of-trade uncertainty.   
  Like equation (6), equation (10) can also be given a graphical interpretation.  
Returning to Figure 1, the second term in equation (10) again relates to the expected value of 
the welfare triangle in the figure.  The critical difference is the first term, which does not 
appear in equation (6).  This term measures the expected value of the relevant rectangles in 
Figure 1, those that involved tariff revenue in the case of own protection, but that now 
represent the expected change  in the cost of imports relative to full market access.  
Comparison of equations (6) and (10) shows that, in the present context, the variance 
component of expected interventions accounts for a relatively more important share of the 







   
III.  An illustration: Uruguay Round agricultural bindings on wheat 
Clearly, our approach is somewhat more complex than standard approaches assuming 
deterministic protection. Whether it is worthwhile to introduce this additional complexity 
will depend in large measure on whether it makes a substantial difference in practical 
applications. Our examination of the approach in the previous section suggested that the 
variance impacts are likely to be relatively larger in the case of own-protection, so we focus 
on that case in the illustrative calculations presented in this section. We provide an 
application to protection of a key agricultural commodity, wheat, in seven OECD countries 
for which ad valorem measures of the final tariff bindings resulting from the Uruguay Round 
are available from analysis undertaken by Ingco (1996). Under the Uruguay Round  
Agreement on Agriculture, developed countries agreed to establish tariff bindings for 
previously unbound agricultural products  with a protective effect equal to the combined 
effects of tariffs and nontariff barriers in a base period (1986-88), and to subsequently reduce 
them by an average of 36 percent in developed countries (24 percent in developing countries) 
and by at least 15 percent (10 percent in developing countries) for each tariff line.  This 
tariffication process affected roughly 13 percent of agricultural trade by value, though it was 
concentrated in the most heavily protected sectors.  Its implications for potential welfare 
effects are therefore greater than suggested by the trade weights.    
  The procedures used to estimate the protective effects of nontariff barriers (to 
facilitate conversion to tariffs) allowed considerable scope for discretion.
7  As a result, many 
of the new tariff bindings in developed and developing countries for products subject to 
tariffication have been set above their levels in the reference period.. This means that many 
of the tariff cuts following from tariffication were from levels well above the average rates 
prevailing prior to the Round.  Developing countries also had the option to set their tariff 
bindings even higher through the use of ceiling bindings (Hathaway and Ingco, 1997).  
Hence, even for sectors not subject to tariffication, developing countries often entered tariff 
bindings significantly above applied rates.  In this situation, simple approaches to evaluating 
the liberalizing effects of agricultural tariff bindings are likely to tell us very little. If the tariff 
                                                   
7 The tariff equivalents were generally to be calculated at the 4-digit level of the Harmonized System, while 






   
bindings are simply compared with the previous average rates of protection, it may even 
appear that the agreement resulted in an increase in protection. 
  The approach we take here is to estimate the mean and variance of the underlying 
distribution of protection, and to evaluate the impact of bindings on the mean level and cost 
of protection.  Comparison of the mean level of protection with the mean of the data during 
the sample period provides an initial indication of the extent of expected liberalization.  We 
take the world price of wheat as exogenous to each individual country, and the rate of 
protection as distributed independently of this world price. In a short run context of sticky 
internal support prices, it is clear that the protection rate is not completely independent of the 
world price on a year to year basis.  In fact, once the domestic price is set for a season under 
arrangements such as the European Union’s variable levy system, the protection rate and the 
world price are perfectly negatively correlated. Over t he longer term, however, there is 
evidence that domestic prices tend to follow world prices of agricultural products, except for 
a stochastic margin term that includes the effects of protection policy (Mundlak and Larson, 
1992).  
  We use data come from the OECD, which has calculated the annual ad valorem 
equivalents of agricultural trade barriers in OECD countries (OECD 1994). We used data 
made available in electronic format by the Agriculture Directorate of the OECD for the 
period 1979-93, that is before the announcement of the provisions of the Uruguay Round 
agreement.  They provide a sample large enough to make a rough calculation of the standard 
deviation of protection for each commodity under the policy regime applying during this 
period. For illustrative purposes, our calculations are based on the assumption that the 
implied functional distribution of protection over the 1979-93 period would continue to 
apply in the future in the absence of a tariff binding.
8   
                                                   
8 At this stage, we remind the reader that these calculations are largely for illustration.  The assumption we just 
made is clearly important  If protection rates are increasing, then this assumption may understate the degree of 
liberalization which has been achieved. Importantly, we also assume that the balance between those seeking and 
resisting protection will be unchanged by the presence of a binding. If, however, both parties are fully rational in 
their understanding of the system, it is possible that the suppliers and demanders of protection would understand 
that a higher level of protection during unbound periods is required to achieve any given level of average 






   
  Table 1 provides estimates of the mean and the standard deviation of protection prior 
to the Round in the first and second rows.  The basic data are summarized in Figure 2.  To 
ensure that our results are not influenced excessively by choice of functional form for the 
distributions, we use two different approaches to specifying the distribution: a normal 
distribution, and a non-parametric approach based on the observed distribution. In the table, 
we provide estimates of the mean and standard deviation of (bound) protection applying 
after the Round. In one case, this was done by assuming that the underlying distribution 
function is normal. In the other case, the observed distribution was Winsorized without 
making any explicit assumption about the distribution.  For the Normal distribution, the 
Winsorized distributions were estimated using Monte Carlo simulations with 1,000 
replications.  The estimated means and variances of the unrestricted distributions, combined 
with the bindings themselves, were the parameters used for the simulations.
9 Finally, the last 
rows show the estimated relative reduction in the expected cost of protection resulting from 
the introduction of the bindings, calculated using equations (6) and (7).  These are 
decomposed into the reduction due to limits on variance, and that due to the reduction in 
mean rates.  Figure 2 provides a comparison of the bound rates with recent history on the 
variability in applied rates. 
  The results in Table 1 and the data in Figure 2 highlight the very substantial variation 
across regions and across time in the rates of border protection. Further, it is clear that the 
final bindings are often well above the average rates of protection applying in the pre-
Uruguay Round era, despite the commitment in the Round to lower protection relative to 
previous average levels. Does this imply that the Uruguay Round  "liberalization " actually 
resulted in increases in protection rates? Not necessarily. When we look at the mean 
protection rates in the table, it is clear that even these generally high bindings can be 
expected to lead to some liberalization in some major markets. This liberalization is 
particularly important in Japan, where the expected level of protection declines by almost 
300 percentage points from the 1979-93 average. 
  A striking feature of the results is just how large are the estimated reductions in the 
costs of protection resulting from the introduction of bindings on wheat, despite the 
                                                   






   
frequently substantial slippage in the settings of the bindings relative to the objectives of the 
Round. In the case of the EU, roughly one-half of the gains are derived from the reduction in 
variability alone, as opposed to the one-half that derive from the reduction in the average rate 
of protection.  In the case of Japan, the reduction in the mean is much larger than that in the 
standard-deviation, implying that the reduction in the mean level of protection is the 
dominant influence in reducing the welfare costs of protection. In this case, so much of the 
probability mass is concentrated at the binding that it effectively becomes a deterministic rate 
of protection. The size of these reductions highlights the very large gains associated with 
initial reductions in rates of protection, and the importance of measuring the effects on both 
the mean and the variability of protection.  Measures of protection which are based on 
methods like equation (7), and which therefore focus only on the reduction in observed 
protection, will only capture reductions related to the mean rate itself.
10 
 
VIII.  Summary and conclusions 
A key feature of multilateral liberalization in recent years has been the introduction of tariff 
bindings which constrain the range and variability of protection rates. While tariff bindings 
allow tariff rates to vary below the level of the binding, they reduce both the average applied 
tariff and the variability of the applied rate of protection. We have argued that protection 
rates can vary in response to a wide range of pressures for protection, and that these pressures 
are likely to continue to generate varying rates of protection even after the introduction of 
new tariff bindings. Accordingly, we characterize trade policy in the presence of a tariff 
binding as generating uncertain rates of protection subject to the limit imposed by the 
binding.  
  As a basis for examining the liberalization of stochastically varying protection, we 
develop a conceptual framework based on the expected cost of protection.  In our basic set of 
examples, involving a single price-based instrument, this cost can be shown to depend on the 
                                                   
10 There is also an apparent time trend in some markets.  Simple regression analysis (as well as visual 
checking of the data in Figure 2) supports this idea.  Statistically, the strongest time trends are in Japan and 
Norway, where rates of protection have increased over 20 percent per year for these sectors.  To the extent 
these represent an underlying secular trend toward permanently higher protection (and not just part of a 
broader swing in protection rates), we have underestimated the impact of bindings on the combined mean and 
variance of protection. 






   
second moment of protection about the origin (or, equivalently, the sum of the squared mean 
and the variance of protection) and the slope of the import demand function. This approach 
highlights the fact that the cost of protection rises with the square of the mean and the 
standard deviation of the rate of protection.  Within this conceptual framework, we discuss 
the possibility of assessing the relative impact of tariff bindings on the total costs of 
protection through calculation of welfare-weighted cost of protection indexes. As illustration 
we have provided examples, based on such indexes, for the effect of tariff bindings on 
imports of wheat.  Even though tariff bindings on this commodity were typically set at levels 
substantially higher than the average rates of protection previously applied, it seems likely 
that the introduction of tariff bindings will yield substantial reductions in the costs of 
protection. 
  The analytical approach followed here has also allowed us to provide a formal 
representation of the concept of “improved market access” following from tariff bindings. 
This is the basic objective of trade negotiations (with zero tariffs being a subset of bound 
tariffs), and so in our view it merits formal analysis. We have shown that improved market 
access, in terms of reduced terms of trade uncertainty related to export market protection, has 
welfare implications that follow not only from the expected level of market access, but also 
from the stability of those conditions of access.  
  A basic objective of this paper has been to push the notion of protection away from 
one based primarily on fixed policy instruments, closer to one that involves policy regimes 
subject to uncertainty and variability.  While the importance of the security and certainty of 
market access has long been recognized in the policy process, little attention has been 
devoted to these issues in the formal economics literature.  As has been demonstrated, the 
stochastic aspect of policy variables can have important implications for the effects of 
negotiated bindings and rules-based policy constraints, beyond those suggested in 
frameworks built around fixed policy regimes. This implies that the near-universal omission 
of the impact of improved stability of market access in studies of multilateral liberalization 
may have greatly understated the potential gains from the process.   
  While we have addressed a number of issues related to bindings and trade policy 






   
view, further research is called for not only on rules-based liberalization and the distribution 
of protection for particular sectors and regions, but also on the impact of bindings given 
linkages in the distribution of protection across instruments and sectors. While we have 
worked with an analytical and computational example involving a single trade policy 
instrument, governments are not so limited in reality.  They actually have a broad array of 
instruments available to choose from in order to limit imports (or exports) and to otherwise 
intervene in trade.  One interpretation of the role of the GATT/WTO is that it seeks to restrict 
the application of these instruments through rules-based disciplines, and an explicit goal of 
requiring that all intervention (at least in manufacturing) involve tariffs.  However, the 
continued success of this endeavor hinges on the coverage of the rules keeping up with the 
development and application of new instruments.  As gray area measures have demonstrated, 
this is not a simple task. Limiting the application of one set of instruments (such as voluntary 
export restraints) may simply lead to the application of alternative instruments.  For example, 
when U.S. steel quotas lapsed in March 1992, they were followed by a series of dumping 
cases.  To be general, an assessment of limiting a particular trade policy instrument, such as 
steel VERS, through the application of rules, may need to include the availability of 
alternative instruments and limitations on those instruments. As long as the degree of 
substitutability between instruments is not perfect, limiting a particular instrument should in 
itself be trade liberalizing.  However, the extent of liberalization will hinge on the 
possibilities for substitution toward other instruments, a process we call  instrument 
switching.  (See Francois and Martin 1997). In addition, it should also be evident that 
reductions in the uncertainty that characterizes the commercial policy landscape could have 
significant effects related to investor uncertainty, and hence to the size and allocation of the 
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Figure 1. The welfare impact of expected protection 
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Figure 2. 
Patterns of Protection 
 


































   
Table 1.  Implications of Uruguay Round agricultural bindings on  
Import protection for wheat 
 
  Effects of Bindings         
  EU  US  Japan  Canada  Norway  Australia  Turkey 
Old mean  0.56  0.12  4.38  0.22  1.70  0.00  0.13 
Old SD  0.37  0.14  1.53  0.18  1.26  0.01  0.29 
               
Normal               
New mean  0.49  0.01  1.50  0.21  1.67  0.00  0.13 
New SD  0.30  0.06  0.19  0.18  1.26  0.01  0.28 
               
Non-parametric               
New mean    0.49  0.02  1.52  0.21  1.70  0.00  0.13 
New SD  0.25  0.02  0.00  0.14  1.26  0.01  0.29 
               
Estimated reduction in the cost of protection(relative to free trade)     
               
Non-parametric  33.50  97.38  89.28  23.28  0.00  60.23  0.00 
   reduction due to   
   mean reduction 
16.81  39.88  78.36  6.91  0.00  8.42  0.00 
   reduction due to    
  variance reduction 
16.69  57.50  10.92  16.36  0.00  51.81  0.00 
Winsorized normal  26.72  90.53  89.45  2.86  2.12  73.51  6.06 
   reduction due to  
   mean reduction 
15.57  40.79  78.70  1.96  2.10  5.41  0.57 
   reduction due to  
  variance reduction 
11.15  49.74  10.76  0.90  0.02  68.10  5.50 
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